In this paper, we present a novel archival system called ARCHAIN, developed for the State Archive-keeping Committee of the Republic of Tatarstan (Russia). Blockchain is the principal part of the system, which stores transactions (facts of transfer of documents to the archive) in a protected form. The developed system uses a permissioned blockchain model due to the customer's requirement for the presence of a trusted center.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain is a novel kind of distributed ledger technology that uses cryptography to protect records during creation and storage. Initially, this technology was used in cryptocurrencies and Bitcoin was the first of them. Many alternatives have appeared with variations on the protocol and basic technology ( [1]- [3] ). Blockchain gives strength to cryptocurrency but it can be used for other purposes as well. Many authors predict the the the widespread use of this technology beyond cryptocurrencies ( [4] - [6] ).
Recently, research and development have been done on the application of blockchain technology in archives. A primary requirement for an archive is to set up mechanisms that will ensure such properties of its contents as authenticity, integrity, trust in records in the long term. These proper-ties can be provided to the system by using cryptographic primitives, including blockchain technology. In the paper [7] author presents a generalization of original studies on blockchain technology in recordkeeping. In this paper, the typology of blockchain solutions records managing as well as a few new archival projects aimed to leverage this innovative digital preservation technology has been presented. Authors of research [8] propose a novel approach to the building of a personal archive management system using blockchain technology. This technology sets the system with the attributes of decentralization, transparency, integrity, and security. In the paper [9] a prototype of ARCHANGEL archival system described. The system based on the Ethereum tools. This paper presents research and development performed by authors under the project "Use of blockchain technology in the field of implementation of acceptance of a scientific and technical documentation mandatory copy for archival storage" between October 2017 and December 2017. This project assumed the use of research results for experimen-tal implementation of the transfer of a scientific and tech-nical documentation mandatory copy to the archive using blockchain technology for the needs of the State Archivekeeping Committee of the Republic of Tatarstan (Russia). The paper describes the concepts, principles, and description of the software system, represented as a part of the project. This paper is organized into four sections as follows:
1) Overview of blockchain technology 2) Technical task and problem statement 3) Possible attacks and security 4) System description
II. OVERVIEW OF BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
Blockchain is a distributed database technology for transaction processing. All transactions of blockchain are stored in a single register. Since all transactions are ordered by the time the current state of the system is defined exclusively by this register. The main difference of blockchain from usual horizontally scalable databases is built-in security. It means computational impossibility to delete or change records in the database. Moreover, security is strengthened by the protocol of the blockchain itself.
Blockchains can be divided into types according to data access [10] .
Public blockchain is a blockchain in which there are no restrictions on data reading or sending of transactions in the blockchain. Private blockchain is a blockchain in which direct access to data and transactions sending is limited to a certain narrow range of participants. Permissionless (inclusive) blockchain is a blockchain in which there are no restrictions on the identity of transaction handlers (users who can create transaction blocks). Exclusive (permissioned) blockchain is a blockchain in which the processing of transactions is carried out by a certain list of identified persons.
Public blockchain technology (such as for example, Bitcoin blockchain) hasn't been widely spread in data registration systems and in document assembly. The main reason for it is an inability to control the processing of transactions (identities of transaction handlers should be known). Refusal from fundamental for public blockchains consensus reaching protocols allows reducing the cost of system functioning. On the other side, many authors believe that exclusive blockchains are perspective in a way of being used by organizations. An exclusive blockchain can be either public or private.
Blockchain technology works with hashing algorithms and digital signatures ( [11] ). A digital signature is a primitive of asymmetric cryptography designed to provide authenticity of a digital message or a document. A digital signature gives grounds to the user to believe that: the message was created by an identified user, the sender can't refuse the fact of sending the message (non-repudiation), the message wasn't changed during the transmission (integrity).
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The task of the project was to investigate the possibility of usage of blockchain technology in archival processes and to create a prototype of software for transfer of a scientific and technical documentation mandatory copy in an archive.
There were some customer restrictions on this system, for example, the necessity of the presence of a trusted center that distributes roles in the system network, as well as Russian Federation legislation requiring that Russian cryptographic standards must be used in cryptographic algorithms.
A. Blockchain structure
Let us start with definitions.
Administrator is an archive or an archive representative. Signature is an electronic digital signature (EDS), formed by the EDS creation algorithm with the use of a private key.
Administrator key (AK) is an open or private EDS key used by the Administrator to sign blocks at the moment of their creation and when making changes to the public key blockchain register.
Participants are organizations or organization representa-tives.
Participant key (PK) is a public or private EDS key used by the Participant when it is assigned by the Expert when the transaction is approved.
Expert is an individual appointed by the Administrator to check the incoming transaction.
Timestamp is a sequence of characters that indicates an occurrence of some event. It usually shows the date and time.
Transaction is data unit containing transaction details and timestamp.
Public key certificates are used in the process of validating (verifying) digitally signed data when the recipient verifies that: the information identifying the sender was consistent with data contained in the certificate; no certificate from the chain of certificates was revoked and all certificates were valid at the time of signing the message; the certificate was used by the sender for its intended purpose; data hasn't been changed since the EDS was created.
The recipient can receive data signed by the sender after verification.
There are several subprograms with a specific purpose:
The program for a timestamp forming is a code fragment that adds a timestamp into the block. The program for forming a block of blockchain is a code fragment that uses a hashing program to form a new block. Verifier 2 is a certificate expiration date program.
Verifier 3 is the program for checking of the main blockchain. Verifier 4 is the program to verify a result of a block creation in the blockchain. The hash program is a program for computing the hash of data. The signing program is a program for generating digital signatures using a private key. The program for the formation of a private and public key. The previous hash is the value of the hash function (hash) which was written in the previous block. The block hash is the value of the hash function obtained from the timestamp, transaction details and expert EDS of the previous hash.
Certificate Authority (CA) is a trusted entity that issues Dig-ital Certificates and public-private key pairs. The Certificate Authority performs the following functions: sets the roles of Administrator, Participant, Expert; distributes private and public keys for authentication;
validates the identity of the entity who requested a digital certificate;
maintains THe Certificate Revocation List (CRL). It is a list of digital certificates which are no longer valid and therefore should not be relied on by anyone.
The blockchain is implemented as a table with three columns (Table I) , where each line represents a separate transaction. The first column stores the transaction timestamp, the second column stores the details of the transaction with the digital signature of the authorized expert, and the third column stores the hash of the current transaction and its details with the hash of the previous transaction. After approval, the expert signs the transaction details and send them to the administrator, who then generates the timestamp and calculates the hash for the timestamp, signature details, and the hash from the previous transaction. When a new transaction is inserted into the block, the new block is distributed to participants. Since everyone knows the last hash, everyone can check that the data hasn't been changed.
In our project, we use algorithms of electronic digital signature and hashing from the family of cryptographic hash functions called "Stribog", project name for GOST R34.10-2012 and GOST R34.11-2012 [12] , [13] .
IV. POSSIBLE ATTACKS AND SECURITY
While working under "Database As a Rule" principle, a password system is viewed as the core tool to database security and reliability. But there is a way to interfere with normal functioning of a database -a corruption of database files. This malicious operation can be revealed with help of systematic observation of the state of database files. One calculates hashes of files and compares them to specific templates that are stored in some reliable place. This way is impossible if a new data can be inserted at any time. What's more, a further problem arises -how to keep the integrity of templates. Usage of blockchain files can partially solve that problem. On the other hand, a simple structure of the database provides an opportunity to hide some changes in data. The structure of database files for other models can be rather complicated while in case of blockchain database any record can be selected very easily. In this section, we demonstrate our approach to the security problem appeared during the designing of the archive database.
The archive blockchain database is intended for keeping records of small size. Those can be diplomas, passports, and information about documents, placed into main storage. Therefore all records in the database contain information about transactions. In this way, placing a transaction into the database means adding a record relating to that transaction in the database. Those transaction does not contain any secret data, so the nature of the attack on the database can be: 1) Change of a record in the database; 2) Removing a record from the database; 3) Adding a record to the database bypassing the blockchain administrator.
There is an important point related to the database integrity verification -the span of time between a malicious operation and the discovery of the attack. At this time intruder can use incorrect data extracted from the corrupted base and since the data obtained from the official database has a proved status, some malicious actions on the database can be undertaken. The fact of intrusion will be detected later, but the intruder will be out of access.
There are only two types of persons that have an opportunity to change the content of the database: the administrator of the blockchain and administrators of servers where the database is deployed, so at least one of them must be involved into any attack. Of course, an illegitimate intrusion into the database from outside is also possible, but the problem of server protection from such attacks has no specialty in our case and it will not be studied in this paper. Now, let's consider each of the attack types described above more thoroughly.
A. Change of a record
According to requirements, the blockhain administrator can't change any transaction. If one has to change the doc-ument related to the transaction, the administrator creates a new transaction performing the procedure mentioned above. If the administrator ignores the duties of the expert, which has to approve the document, this formed transaction will not be signed by the expert. To prevent this from happening, one additional feature of the program that inserts transaction into the database must be implemented. Each expert that approves a document must have a second key that gives access to the procedure for placing the transaction. It means that such an attack can be performed only under collusion between the administrator and the expert.
B. Removing a record
Only the server administrator can do it. The standard procedure for checking of database integrity will detect this event very easily. The only question is who will be notified of this situation. The database administrator or a supervisor of higher rank can be the one who starts the regular procedure for checking of integrity. The person who started the procedure must be aware of the result of the procedure. Although in that case, a kind of collusion can have a place too, the time between the intrusion and its detection has a critical value.
C. Adding a record while bypassing the regular procedure From our point of view, this is the most real danger related to usage of blockchain database. At the time the last record is added to the base, this last record is not protected. The server administrator can replace this record with any other while just keeping the hash of the previous record. The next record will be added by the regular procedure, and the malicious operation will be detected only after analysis of the content of the record. It goes get a lot of time. To make such an attack impossible, we suggest modifying the regular procedure by adding some special operations. First of all, one develops a very fast procedure for calculation of the hash of a big file. The hash is not particularly reliable but it is intended for keeping information between two sequential addings of records. While creating the first record of the blockchain, one calculates the hash of that record and saves the hash in a file. The modified procedure for adding a new record to the database is as follows:
1) Create the hash of the database and compare the hash with the one in the old file. 2) If the calculated hash does not equal to the one in the old file, then alarm notification arises. 3) Extend the blockchain by the new record, delete the old file and create a new file with a new hash calculated on the base of the extended blockchain.
The problem is who keeps this file with the hash. If blockchain administrator does it, then any malicious oper-ation can be performed only under collusion between both blockchain and server administrators. This is a more reliable solution but it is not very convenient since the file must be transferred twice during any transaction. The other solution uses an automatic procedure. Let us call the old file as a secret file. It means that the name of this file is generated on the base of the content of the blockchain. The name looks like a random sequence, and the file is stored somewhere in a system folder of the main server. The only protection from the server administrator to malicious actions, in that case, is opacity of the database manipulation for the server administrator.
The algorithm for creation of the secret file is presented be-low (Algorithms 1, 2). Since blockchain file has byte structure, all operations are also byte oriented. The procedure OneStep performs calculation StateNew = Matr StateOld Byte. All operations here are performed in GF(2) field. Matr is 8 8 binary matrix stored as the byte array of length 8. Two companion matrices of two primitive 8degree polynomials are chosen in the main algorithm. Those matrices correspond to polynomials with coefficients 100011101 and 110101011 respectively [14] . Functions of the archive include acceptance of documents for storing and information support on already accepted documents. To provide these features the system implements a public blockchain of transactions that contain information about the accepted documents. This blockchain will make it possible to verify the acceptance of the document at the specified time while also containing a part of the document details and information about network members who participated in transferring this document to the system. The genesis block is a transaction which is issued and signed by the administrator only. The genesis transaction contains neither data about the document nor a link to the previous transaction. Data imprints and signatures are implemented by the use of the cryptography standard "Stribog".
B. Roles of participants
The system can be described as the interaction of participants in three roles: Administrator, Expert, and User. Roles Users create and upload documents to the network. Admin-istrators select an expert for each of the created documents and add them to the archive after expert's approval. Experts make decisions on documents -if the document is improperly formalized, has some metadata missing or doesn't comply to some local legislation, then it should be denied from transferring to the archive.
C. Document management algorithm
The life cycle of the document in the system from the moment of creation to archival transfer can be characterized as a sequence of document status changes. A document can have one of the following statuses:
1) "Created" -this status is assigned after the user uploads the document to the network. 2) "On examination" -for each of documents the Admin-istrator selects the Expert who must make a decision on the document.
3) "Approved" -the Expert considers that the document was properly formed, contains all data required and it is ready to be transferred to the archive. 4 ) "Rejected" -the Expert considers that the document is not ready to be transferred to the Archive. The User must create a new document with all changes needed. 5) "Expired" -a fixed time is given for examination after which the status of the document will be changed automatically, and the Expert will lose the opportunity to make a decision on the document. 6) "Added" -after receiving the Expert's verdict, the Administrator transfers the document to the archive.
Each document status change is propagated through the system as an intermediate transaction signed by the appropriate role: the status "Created" is signed by the User, statuses "Approved" and "Rejected" are signed by the Expert, statuses "On examination", "Expired", and "Added" are signed by the Administrator. Intermediate transactions are available to all participants of the network, but their role in the system is formal as they are not added into the blockchain. After receiving the "Added" status, the final transaction on the document is formed and added to the blockchain.
D. Software implementation
The User and Expert roles are implemented as desktop client applications.
The Administrator role is implemented as two applications: the desktop client and the server administrative node. Ad-ministrative nodes are used to store document data before transferring it for storage on archive servers and to connect users to each other. Network members can also directly connect to each other.
Desktop client applications are implemented using the Electron framework. The administrative node is written in Golang.
To connect network members, the HTML5 WebSockets protocol is utilized, as it provides an easy two-way exchange of arbitrary data. Due to the restrictions imposed on cryptography standards in the state institutions of the Russian Federation, an unprotected version of the WebSocket protocol is used, but security and encryption are provided at the application level using the standards of Russian cryptography.
For the system to work, it is appropriate to provide a trusted channel of data exchange between the certification authority and the administrative node. In the implemented prototype, this channel was made available to the use of REST API on the side of the administrative node paired with authorization tokens.
E. Certification Authority
Trust in the system is provided through a centralized Certification Authority. Such a decision, of course, forces us to abandon a part of the decentralized nature of the blockchain technology. However, in this way system participants are rid of the need for expensive calculations. Meanwhile, every member of the network retained the ability of verification performed under each document transaction. The certification authority distributes information on current valid certificates to the participants of the network. Thus, any node can verify all connected network members, and any network member can verify the authenticity of transactions.
The main tasks of certification authority are: Registration of new participants in the network;
Edition of public key certificates for users and adminis-trators of the system; Support for active and expired certificates;
Checking for the authenticity and integrity of certificates; Notifying to system participants of the certification authority blockchain updates. The Certification Authority is implemented as an ASP.NET application developed with C# programming language. Post-greSQL was used to store data.
F. User registration
User passwords are, as usual, stored in the database in form of "Stribog" hashes. After the authorization is completed, the user has an opportunity to enter personal profile settings and specify additional information about first name, last name, organization, e-mail etc.
Each member of the network plays its own role. Two new roles were defined in the Certification Authority in addition to the ones mentioned above:an Unconfirmed User and Certification Authority Administrator (CA Administrator). Unconfirmed User doesn't have access to any of applications and can't own the certificate. The principal task of the CA Administrator is the distribution of roles for all users registered in the system. He is provided with the list of all registered users with their role select controls.
G. Certificate support
If the CA Administrator assigns the user a category other than an Unconfirmed User category, the user's public key certificate will be automatically generated based on user profile This text file can be downloaded by his owner at any time. Russian standard GOST R 34.10-2012 is used for electronic digital signature creation. This algorithm is based on elliptic curves in a finite field. In our implementation, we used an EDS algorithm with a key length of 512 bit. The public key is the point P (x; y) of the predefined elliptic curve E, where x; y are 512-bit coordinates of the point P . The elliptic curve E and the point Q lying on it are chosen unanimously. The private key is the 512-bit number k, such that P = k Q. The Certification Authority Administrator has its own pair of keys, the validity of which is unlimited in time.
Public and private keys are generated in the process of new certificate creation. The public key is stored in the certificate, and the private key is shown to the user only once, so it is very important not to lose it. The certificate data is written to a special blockchain of all certificates after the certificate is created. It is a blockchain in which the hash values of all previously created certificates are stored, as well as the signature of the CA Administrator (Table II) .
After building of a new block in the blockchain of all certificates, the blockchain update is sent to the Administrator server node. If the user already had an active certificate, we create a new block for the old certificate in the other blockchain of revoked certificates. Thus, checking of the validity of a certificate comes down to finding it's hash value in both of blockchains. If it is found in the blockchain of revoked certificates, the certificate will be decided as invalid. If it is not found there, but it is found in the blockchain of all issued certificates, the certificate will be decided as valid.
If the certificate expires, it will be automatically revoked and its owner will be prompted to create a new one. If the CA Administrator changes user's category to the Unconfirmed User category, the certificate will be revoked without the right to receive a new one until the user will have receieved a not Unconfirmed User category.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have described ARCHAIN a system for secure stor-age of transactions within the archive. We have offered an architecture as well as its software implementation. Although the described system is a prototype, further extension of the function is possible. Such an extension provides secure storage of not only transactions but also large enough artifacts, such as audio and video materials. Further development involves the deployment of the software for use in the whole archival system of the Republic of Tatarstan, as well as its integration into the system of recordkeeping. As one of the significant achievements of the work, the authors consider the new methods of protection against cheating at the time of a new block creation are proposed. The method is also applicable in the case of the corporate database, when the file is stored in a single instance, for this case the developed system is suitable for protecting the contents of the file from attacks from the administrator of the storage server.
